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Jn this A..,.._ PtOfestlots Kahn llJ1d Lehman SIJ}UB 
that the concept of tax expsnd"tluteS Is l1aw«I as a 
tool for rr,s{ISUflng the proptiely of lax ptOVi8lona. If 
assum1JS the. exlstene6 of on11 llU6 anti conect stan-
dal(J of federal lncoms. taxallon. lhal .,,,,,.. to al 
circumstances. To maks that assumption, the 
fJl'OPOl1«Jfs of ·t11e concept ;npiclly make a paltic;ulat" 
motal claim about.,,,. telatlve ~ of a wide 
range of values. Including •ffk:ltlncy, consump-
tion/savings neutfJl/lty, ~ dlsttllutlonaJ. eqtM(y, 
a.dministrs.billty, cha~ and pflJ(lfNlll6m. 71Nly. lh8n 
tneSSUffl a tax provis/Oft's ~ ex.dusltleJy by 
how It conforms to their Plafonlc conoept·d tJcome. 
ProfGssors Kahn and Lehman maintain that 
them is no single ideal COtff»PI of Jncorps. lnBlea4 
there are a number of plauslble candldatsa, the 
choice among which constltut•s . a contnlable. 
political decision. The tax Bxpenditure budgets cre-
ate an Hlusion of value-ltN ~~In a 
world where It is nelthtlr possible nor deslrabte. to 
ignora the range of eoclefal vsluH that speak to 
how an incoms tax codlJ Is structuffld.. The authots 
believe that the tax expenditure concept. dlstotts 
public debate over tax p10vislons. 
During the past few months, Tax Notes has featured an 
extended discussion about the •normalcy" (or lack thereof) 
of accelerated depreciation. 1 Two contributions to that dis-
cussion came from Professor Calvin Johnson of the Univer-
sity of Texas law School, who disagreed with certain 
aspects of an article that Professor Kahn wrote in 1979.2 
And the debate shows no sign of slowing down. 3 
'The discussion began with an article last September. David 
Davenport, "The 'Proper' Taxation of Human Capital• (Tax Notes, 
Sept. 16, 1991, p. 1401). It continued with the following letters--
Calvin Johnson (Tax Notes, No\t. 18, 1991. p. 858); Douglas 
Kahn {Tax Notes, Dec. 2, 1991, p. 1079); Michael Mcintyre (Tax 
Notes, Dec. 16, 1991, p. 1319); Douglas Kahn (Tax Notes, Dec. 
16, 1991, p. 1319); Michael Schier (Tax Notes, Dec. 23, 1991, 
p. 1430); Calvin Johnson (Tax Notes. Dec. 30, 1991. p. 1523); 
Deborah Geier, (Tax Notes, Jan. 27, 1992, p. 458). 
2Couglas A. Kahn, •Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expendi~ 
ture or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?• 78 Mich. 
L. Rav. 1 (1979). 
3 The most recemt contribution is from David Davenport, Tax 
Notes, Mar. 16, 1992, p. 1399. 
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TAX EXPENDITURE BUDGETS: 
A CRITICAL VIEW 
by Douglas A. Kahn 
and Jeffrey S. Lehman 
The interchange over the details of accelerated 
depreciation offers a useful backdrop against which to 
consider a more general issue: the inteUectual coherence 
of the tax expenditure budgets. 4 The larger concept of 
tax expenditures was what motivated Kahn to examine 
the •normalcy*' of accelerated depreciation 13 years auo. 
And, to our eyes at least, the issues raised by the concept 
are no less interesting today than they were in 1979. 
The various tax expenditure budgets prepared in the 
legislative and executive branches purport to carry out a 
straightforward task. They claim to identify those situa-
tions in which Congress has departed from the •norma-
tive,• •normal,• or •correct• tax rule in a way that i.s 
equivalent to the appropriation of public funds. Or, as it 
is sometimes put. they expose circumstances in which 
Congress has chosen to subsidize certain activities in·· 
directly, through the Internal Revenue Code. 
An Income tax stands Inside, not outside, 
th.J society that enacts It .. 
Yet, the very statement of the task exposes its Achilles 
heel. It assumes the existence of one true, 11correct,• 
•normative'" rule of federal income taxation that should 
be applied to any given transaction. The collection of all 
such rules stands as a kind of Platonic Internal Revenue 
Code, an implicit reprimand to the flawed efforts of oi..;. 
mortal Congress. 5 
We believe that questions of tax policy are more com· 
plicated than that. An ideal Internal Revenue Code makes 
no more sense than an ideal Environmental Protection 
Act or an ideal Penal Code. An income tax stands inside, 
not outside. the society that enacts it. 
The particular contours of our federal mcome tax serve 
to reaffirm public values that are ·normative.. in every 
sense of the word except the one used by advocates of 
tax expenditure budgets. The disallowance of a deduc-
tion for illegal bribes confirms that we think they are 
"The prominence of tax expenditure budgets in tax policy 
debates is due largely to the efforts of the rate Stanley Surrey. 
For a fair reflection of Surrey's views, see Stanley Surrey & Pat.'i 
McDaniel, Tax Expenditures {1985). 
5":f ax expenditure analysis, as applied to a particular tax, 
requires an understanding of the normative structure of that tax 
in order to determine whether a provision is a part of the 
structural or the tax el(penditure comr'"'"'9nt. • Id. 3-4. 
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naughty. Similarly, the limitation on losses from wagering 
transactions shows that we do not consider them to be 
an appropriate foundation for a career. Conversely, the 
exclusion from income of tort recoveries is an expression 
of public compassion. And our refusal to tax people when 
their neighbors help them move furniture, or (as some 
have suggested) when they enjoy a few moments of 
leisure. suggests a shared sense of a 9rivate domain in 
which even the tax collector will respect people's right to 
be left alone. 
Experts can help to clarify the implications of one tax 
policy choice over another. They can show how one 
choice favors one particular set of moral, political, or 
economic commitments over another. They can argue for 
greater consistency in the way tensions among such 
commitments are resolved. They can estimate the dif· 
ferences in the amount and distribution of revenues that 
would be collected under different regimes. But, the ul-
timate choice must rest with the citizen and not the 
oracle. 
The Choice Amone Utopias 
Let us describe a series of perspectives that are fre-
quently presented concerning the ideal nature of an in-
come tax: 
(1) For some observers of the tax scene, any tax that 
alters citizen behavior is terribly unfortunate. Such ob-
servers decry any tax that alters individuals' economic 
incentives from what they would have been in a world 
with no taxes and a perfect marketplace. They woi.lld 
prefer that the government raise its revenues exclusively 
by taxing (a) activities that generate negative external· 
ities, and (b) goods for which the demand is entirely 
inelastic. Since no income tax can pretend to be nondis-
tortional, such observers view all income taxes as tainted 
by a kind of •original sin: 
(2) Other, more practically minded observers, worry 
that the taxes that would satisfy perspective (1) would 
not generate enough revenues for the government to 
finance its current level of operations. They believe that 
Nicholas Kaldor had it right almost 40 years ago, when 
he argued that the proper income tax system is what we 
now call a consumption tax. Such observers are willing 
to accept the fact that a consumption tax biases tax-
payers' choice between labor and leisure. They console 
themselves with the observation that ~t least a consump-
tion tax avoids biasing the choice between savings and 
current consumption. 
At least a consumption tax avoids biasing 
the choice between savings and current 
consumption. 
(3) Another set of commentators objects that a con-
sumption tax that would satisfy persp,ective (2) ignores 
the new economic power reflected in congealed, uncon-
sumed, newly acquired wealth. They contend that all 
such economic power should be reckoned in the tax 
base, perhap!> as a proxy for an (ideal) wealth tax. For 
such observers, the touchstone of income taxation must 
be the sum of consumption and wealth accumulation-
what is commonli' known as Haig-Simons income. 
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(4) Still other commentators find fault with the pure 
Haig-Simons approach endorsed under perspective (3). 
It would offend such commentators' notions of privacy to 
tax citizens on unrealized asset appreciation and on im-
puted income from servicas or durable goods. Or, at 
least, it would require a preposterous expenditure of ad-
ministrative resources in an ultimately futile quest. These 
observers would prefer that we tax Haig-Simons income 
to the extent it is realized through market interactions. 
(5) Vat another set of commentators finds fault with 
even the market-delimited, realization-qualified version 
of the Haig-Simons approach suggested by perspective 
(4). They believe that such an approach unacceptably 
distorts investor incentives, leading them to overconsume 
and undersave, to indulge in too much leisure and not 
enough work. While they are in sympathy with the political 
vision that would allocate the tax burden according to 
accumulating economic power, they favor qualifications 
to that vision whenever the cost to productive incentives 
appears to jeopardize economic growth. 
The tax expenditure budget's conception of 
an appropriate tax base has no legitimate 
claim to establishing the terms of political 
debate. 
(6) Finally, one finds the United States Congress. It 
apparently believes that even the approach dictated by 
perspective (5) would leave the American economy in the 
wrong place. Not enough research and development, not 
enough low-income housing, not enough money in the 
hands of working families with children, not enough 
money in the hands of churches and museums, too many 
renters and not enough homeowners, etc., etc., etc. 
If one is prone to depression, one can view the forego-
ing list of perspectives from ( 1) to (6) as identifying a kind 
of linear decline. Each is one step further frorn the Garden 
of Eden of distortion-free taxation.' We vi<aw them dif· 
ferently. We prefer to see each perspective as emphasiz-
ing different elements in a basket of normative values-
efficiency (in the neoclassical economic sense), 
consumption/savings neutrality, privacy, equity, ad-
ministrability, charity, pragmatism, etc. 
What is disturbing about the language of tax expendi-
tures is its tone of moral absolutism. The tax expenditure 
budget is said to distinguish ·normal• tax practice from 
that which is deviant. Sometimes it is said t<:> distinguish 
provisions that are "normative• (?) from those that are 
(presumably) nonnormative (?!). This language is doubly 
confusing. First, it suggests that provisions that fit within 
the implicit baseline of the tax expenditure budget are 
somehow pure, safe, and good. They sht)uld not be 
changed because "neutral• principles have blessed them. 
6 A marginally less depressive type might derivt~ a trace of 
hope from the so-called "theory of the second-best.· Perhaps 
the move from perspective (4) to perspective (5) •Jn<loes some 
of the "damage• that was done by the prior "declines.· For a 
sophisticated discussion of the relevance of the thoory of the 
second best to tax policy analysis, see Daniel Shaviro, "Selective 
Limitations on Tax Benefits," 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1189, 1218·20 
(1989). 
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Conversely, the language suggests that provisions that 
fall outside the implicit baseline of the tax expenditure 
budget (tax expenditures) are somehow corrupt, 
dangerous, and evil. They shoulci be changed as soon 
as possible to conform with the •neutral• position. To Hirt 
with them is to call one's probity into question. 
This is, of course, a bit of an overstatement. But, it 
captures the t"hetorical direction of the tax expenditure 
budget. And that rhetorical direction is grossly mislead-
ing. The tax expenditure budget's conception of an ap-
propriate tax base has no legitimate claim to establishing 
the terms of political debate. It should not immunize 
piovisions of the code from political discussion, nor 
should it change the burden of justification for others. 
The Illusion of Value-Free Pre:lslon-An Example 
The reference point for construction of the tax expen-
diture budget is a measure of ttixable income that is close 
to position (4) above, with some variations.7 That may be 
some people's Platonic Internal Revenue Code, but it is 
obviously not everyone's. The choice among perspectives 
is a contestable, contingent, political decision. Thus, while 
the several existing tax expenditure budgets give an ap-
pearance of being the producis of a highly sophisticated, 
expert, neutral examination of the tax system, they could 
!ust as accurately be characterized as exercises in mys-
tificatiun. They create only an illusion of value-free scientific 
precision in a heavily politicized domain. • 
Consider two features of our tax system. First, it grants 
a form of acclerated depreciation. Second, it does not tax 
unrealized gains. The first feature appears in tax expen-
diture budgets. Moreover, as the Tax Notes discussion 
over the past few months has made clear, many pro-
ponents of tax expenditure budgets view that as a good 
thing because they believe that accelerated depreciation 
is not •normative. • Yet the second feature-the refusal to 
tax unrealized gains-does not appear in any tax expen-
diture budget. 
The tax expenditure budget baseline, which distin-
guishes between these two features, is •normative• in the 
sense that it advances a particular moral or political 
claim. It reflects a particular balance among the ideals of 
efficiency, equity, neutrality, administrability, privacy, 
charity, and pragmatism. But, each of the six perspec-
tives enumerated in the prior section is "normative• in 
precisely the same way. And at most two of the six per-
spectives (perspective (4) and perhaps some versions of 
7Surrey and McDaniel describe the "normative" ideal as being 
"based or. the Schanz-Haig-Simons (S-H-S) economic definition 
of income. • coupled with "widely accepted standards of business 
accounting: but "tempered by reference to 'the generally ac-
cepted structure of an income tax.,. /d. at 4. For a slightly 
different approach, see Michael Mcintyre, "A Solution to the 
Problem of Defining a Tax Expenditure," 14 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 
79 (1980). 
'Note that the problems we sketch in the text do not exhaust 
the ways in which value-free scientific precision in this domain 
is illusory. Suppose that the choice of normative framework 
were not politically contestable, and that everyone agreed that 
the Haig-Simons definition was the appropriate Platomc ideal. 
As Professor Bittker pointed out long ago, ambiguities within 
that concept leave substantial discretion to the drafter of the 
tax expenditure budget See Boris Bittker, "Accounting for 
Federal 'Tax Subsidies' in the National Budget," 22 Nat'/ Tax .t. 
244 (1969); Boris Bittker, "The Expenditure Budget-a Reply to 
Professors Surrey and Hellmuth." 22 Nat'/ Tax J. 538 (1969). 
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perspective (5)) would distinguish between these two 
features. The others would treat both as good or both as 
objectionable. 
Orte can advance plausible arguments in favor of 
taxing unrealized gains. One can advance plausible ar-
guments against granting accelerated depreciation de-
ductions. One could also argue for the status quo with 
regard to each oi these features. But, there is no a priori 
reason to classify one feature differently from the other, 
or to allocate a heavier burden of persuasion to those 
who attack realization or defend accelerated depreciation 
than one allocates to those who defend realization or 
attack accelerated depreciation.' 
Obfuscating the Debat.-Another Example 
In addition to this central conceptual flaw, tax expen-
diture budgets have the unfortunate tendency to confuse 
by inviting an easy equation of "tax expenditures· with 
direct expenditures of federal dollars. Tax expenditures 
automatically become ·subsidies. • And central questions 
about the appropriate goals for our American income tax 
get lost in the transition. 
Tax expenditure budgets have the unfor-
tunate tendency to confuse by Inviting an 
easy equation of 'tax expenditures' with 
direct expenditures of federal dollars. 
Consider the additional standard deductions available 
to the blind and to the elderly, listed as tax expenditures 
by the Congressional Budget Office. How might it be 
meaningful to speak of these deductions as ·subsidies·? 
Surely they do not subsidize behavior that Congress de· 
sires. We may be able to make ourselves look older or 
younger, but dates of birth seem immutable. And sadistic 
though our elected representatives might be, no one be-
lieves they want taxpayers to blind themselves. 
No, in this context, the only conceivable way to think 
of the deductions as subsidies is ta emphasize that they 
show solicitude for a particular category of people-a 
form of welfare expenditure through the Internal Revenue 
Code. To be sure, the solicitude takes the form of a 
deduction against taxable income rather than that of, for 
example, a refundable credit against taxes along the lines 
of the Earned Income TPLx Credit. Thus, it is more sym-
bolic than financial solicitud(! in the case of blind and 
elderly people who would have no taxable income even 
without the extra deductions. But, some would say, that is 
precisely the point. The deductions are not only subsidies. 
liSurrey and McDaniel justify the decision not to include the 
doctrine of realization in tax expenditure budgets by invoking the 
"generally accepted structure of an income tax"; the doctrine is 
one of "those items [that] have not been commonly regarded as 
income for tax purposes." Ibid. The notion of a "generally ac· 
cepted structure· is (to put it mildly) not self-defining ("commonly 
regarded" for how long and by whom?). It has much more the 
air of a conclusion than of a principle for analysis. Moreover, if 
"generally accepted" and "commonly regarded" are intended to 
evoke the importance of tradition and continuity in the de-
velopment of the tax laws (values we share), why are those 
values different in kind from the kinds of justifications commonly 
offered for items included in the tax expenditure budgets? 
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but no nuty, upeide-dcwm IUbaidiel that benefit the 
~ and blind rich bul not the elderly and blind poor. 111 
The problem with this line of argument is that it tempts 
us eo sneak aJOUnd thlough the baCk door to reach a 
conduaion without confronting the contestable premises 
undettying that conclusion. In this context, the conclusion 
that the deductions are tax expenditures might presume 
that under a •nonnative• Income tu, all taxpayers should 
receive the same -standatd deduction. • It might be un-
deralood u an initial •zero bracker in the progressive 
rate structure. But if that is so, why are not differences 
in standard deduction (or in the rate structure itself) 
based on marital status just as objectionable? Such dif· 
ferences exist in current law, but are not listed in the tax 
expenditure bl.ldget. 
More directly, why isn't any standard deduction for 
nonitemized expenditures a tu expenditure? Why isn't 
the existence of marginal rates below the highest mar-
ginal rate a tu expenditure? What is the logic that pro· 
tects a progressive rate structure from being branded 
nonnormative? 
What Is the logic that protects a progres-
sive rate structure from being brsnded non-
normative? 
The debate over progreasive taxation continues to 
follow its uneasy course.11 Among the defenses that SEtem 
to retain substantial support, however, are variants of the 
•equal-sacrifice• position-the i~ that the burdens of 
government should exact a roughly equal sacrifice from 
each taxpayer. Such defenses tum out to be theoretically 
difficult. It is easy to assume that any individual will ex-
perience a declining marginal utility of income, as he or 
she moves from •necessities• to •tuxuries. • But, there is 
no reason to think that different individuals will see mar-
ginal utility decline at the same rate, or in the same 
pattern. And at some level, the interpersonal utility com-
parisons implicit in the purest conception of •equal 
sacrifice• become meaningless. 
But ttlis defense of progressive taxation is willing to 
live with a somewhat less pure conception of "-equal 
sacrifice. • It makes the social judgment that rich people 
can afford to spare more of their next dollar of income 
than poor people can. Rathsr than measuring citizens' 
personal utility curves, the rate structure can be said to 
describe a social judgment about what standardized 
hypothetical utility curve we are willing to attribute to 
citizens for the purpose of allocating the tax burden. 
101t bears mention that the distributional affects of this par· 
ticular deduction are not so thoroughly •upside down• as they 
were before the provision was changed from a personal exemp· 
tion allowance to an additional standard deduction. The stan.1ard 
de<'uction is of use only to taxpayers who do notitemize their 
deductions (taxpayers who tend to have lower incomes than 
itemizers), and its benefits are phased out for very·high·income 
taxpayers. 
11See. e.g., Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, "Social 
Wetfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressiva 
Taxation." 75 Calif. L. Rev. 1905 (1987); Walter Blum and Harry 
Kalven, "Th& Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation." 19 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 417 (1952). 
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Note something about this logic: it could equally well 
support arguments in favor of certain forms of public 
direct expenditures on behalf of all poor people. Yet that 
fact alone is not enough to lead tax expenditure budgets 
to include the low marginal rates found in a progressive 
rate structure. We presume that is because one might 
plausibly think it especially relevant in the tax context-a 
reason to lower an individual's tax burden that might not 
be powerful enough to warrant the creation of a program 
of direct public expenditures. 
This same logic, however, can also support the special 
deductions for the blind and the elderly. Such deductions 
can be seen as rough adjustments to the standardized 
hypothetical utility curve-a crude recognition that those 
who are blind or aged must spend more to meet their 
basic needs than young, sighted taxpayers must spend. 
Moreover, one might plausibly think such a recognition 
to be especially relevant in the tax context. A supporter 
of equal-sacrifice progressivity could plausibly support an 
adjustment to the rate schedules of the blind and the 
elderly without necessarily feeling compelled to support 
a direct expenditure program on their behalf. 
ConcluGion 
Tax expenditure budgets divide all tax provisions into 
categories. One category comprises •pure tax• provisions 
that appear to serve no ·nontax• goals. The deduction 
allowed a business for paying a commission to a sales-
man may be a representative example. The other cate-
gory comprises "pure subsicly" provisions that seem to 
serve only nontax goals. The Earned Income Tax Credit, 
which subsidizes the wages of low-incvme workers with 
children, may be a representative example. To the extent 
tax provisions micht arguably serve both tax and nontax 
goals, the function of the tax expenditure budget is to 
decide which set of goals predominates. 
Our tsx lsws respond to fundaments/ ques-
tions sbout what vslues mstter to us ss s 
society. The tax expenditure budget 
presumes that some of us should be 
deemed to know the snswers better thsn 
others. 
Our point is that very few items fit neatly into one 
category or the other. Virtually all provisions of the tax 
laws have elements that some individuals might consider 
independent of the ·core· task of measuring a particular 
concept of •income." On the other hand, since any income 
tax, no matter how deiined, will influence citizen behavior, 
it would be a strange tax system that pretended to ignore 
those eHects. Those effects are properly important con-
siderations in determining which conception of income 
we would like to use. 
We think democratic debate would be promoted if we 
knew how much additional revenue could be gained by 
repealing each of the code provisions shown in the vari-
ous tax expenditure budgets, as well as who would bear 
the incidence of that additional revenue. We think demo-
cratic debate would also be promoted in precisely the 
same way, however, if we knew how much additional 
revenue could be gained through a host of changes to 
provisions that are not shown on the tax expenditure 
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bucgets. Most tax provisions, like most policy judgments, 
are good only as long as their price tags are not exor-
bitant. Here again, the tax expenditure budget hides that 
fact by suggesting that certain features of the tax system 
are different in kind from others. 
More generally, our critical view of tax expenditure 
budgets is pragmatic, not nihilistic. We do not believe 
that all arguments are equally good, or equally per-
suasive. Indeed, the two of us often disagree between 
ourselves about whether a particular argument is per-
suasive or not. But we both believe strongly that the need 
to evaluate such arguments on their (•normative•) merits 
cannot be obviated by talismanic reference t'"l an •expert• 
understanding of one particularized vision of the "normal• 
or •ideal• tax base. 
We find it valuable to point out those provisions of the 
code that depart from what one would expect to find if 
one's sole concern were measuring accumulations of 
wealth during a taxable year. We also find it valuable to 
point out the different conceptions of •consumption• that 
might underlie arguments for or against the allowance of 
a particular deduction. But in precisely the same way, we 
find it valuable to point out the different conceptions of 
"privacy- or ·~amilY- or "charity" that might underlie argu-
ments for or against other provisions of the code. Our tax 
laws respond to h;ndamental questions about what 
values matter to us as a society. The tax expenditure 
budget presumes ihat some of us should be deemed to 
know the answers better than others. 12 
12After completing this article, we came across two intriguing 
articles. In ·oualified Plans and Identifying Tax Expenditures: A 
Rejoinder to Professor Stein," 9 Am. J. of Tax Policy257 (1991), 
Professor Edward Zelinsky presses some of the same points we 
make above in the conte:rt of debates over the appropriate 
income tax treatment of pension savings. Similarly, in •rax Ex-
penditures: A Reassessment," 1988 Duke L.J. 1155, Professor 
Victor Thuronyi appreciates some of the problems created by 
the inescapably subjective nature of the tax expenditure concept. 
He suggests that it would be more productive for analysts to 
identify lists of ·substitutable tax provisions"-provisions of the 
code whose ·significant purposes• might be achieved at least as 
well through a direct expenditure program. 
Professor Thuronyi's approach offers. advantages over Pro-
fessor Surrey's. As we understand Professor Thuronyi, he sees 
less normative significance to the existence of a potential non-
tax substitute for a tax provision than Professor Surrey saw to 
tax expenditures. He appreciates that whether the nontax pro-
vision or the tax provision is more desirable depends up-?n the 
particular package of •purposes• one is interest&d in fulfilling, 
and it appears that he would require preparers of such lists to 
specify and expose to debate the •purposes· that they believe 
the tax provision is intended to serve. 
On the other hand, as Professor Thuronyi himself recog-
nizes, the preparation of a list of "substitutable" provisions 
within the code carries the same problems of subjectivity and 
indeterminacy as the preparation of a tax expenditure budget. 
That means his proposal raises the same problems of expertise, 
burden-shifting. and mystification we have set forth in the text 
at.ova. The substantive arguments that would lead one to in-
clude a provision on the "list" are, of course, arguments that 
could be presented directly for the provision's repeal and (per-
haps) replacement with a direct expenditure program. So why 
do we need experts to identify a separate "lisr? We are con-
cerned that whatever benefits might attend the preparation of 
a single, all-inclusive "list• of ·substitutable tax provisions• 
would be overwhelmed by the cost to the political process nf 
delegating a special power to the experts charged with prepar 
ing the lists. 
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Consider the question, ·should the N.'ltional Zoo 
house panda bears?" if one were to hold a pul~lic hearing 
on the matter, one could expect to hear a range of inter-
esting arguments presented by citizens interested in is-
sues ranging from urban planning to animal rights, from 
budgetary policy to biological diversity. Yet, consider how 
you would react to a person who ottered the following 
testimony: 
I am from the American Society of Zookeeping 
Experts. In my expert opinion, and in the opinion of 
my fellow experts, 'normative zoos' are, by defini-
tion, zoos that house no animals other than bears(!) 
Following the traditions of my discipline, I have 
accordingly engaged in substantial research into 
the question whether panda bears are truly bears 
or merely raccoons. I report to you today that they 
are raccoons. Accordingly, I have placed panda 
bears on the Roster of Prohibited Animals. 
Tax experts, like zookeeping experts, are important 
members of American society. Their ideas should figure 
prominently in debates over national tax policy. The ques-
tion for us is whether tax expenditure budgets grounded 
in a contestable vision of tax policy are ultimately any 
more valuable to such debate than a Roster of Prohibited 
Animals grounded in ..tn idiosyncratic vision of zookeep-
ing. 
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